

Simple Ciphers	<p>Shift cipher: letters as numbers, modular shift by constant factor</p> <p>Transposition cipher: key is permutation of letter position</p> <p>Substitution cipher: swap character sequences around according to known mapping</p> <p>Vigenere cipher: shift cipher with multi-letter repeated key</p>	Prior Knowledge Hash Tree	<p>Publish $h(M)$ for your M, possibly $h(N M)$ for small M</p> <p>Leaves contain message hashes, branches hashes of subhashes</p>
Security	<p>Computational or unconditional</p> $p_C(C) = \sum_K p_K(K) p_P(D(K, C))$ $p_C(C P) = \sum_{\{K P=D(K,C)\}} p_K(K)$ $p_P(P C) = \frac{p_P(P) p_C(C P)}{p_C(C)}$ $= \frac{p_P(P) \sum_{\{K P=D(K,C)\}} p_K(K)}{\sum_K p_K(K) p_P(D(K, C))}$	One Time Signatures	<p>Have secret keys $2n$ random R_{ij}, public key $2n$ $h(R_{ij})$: signature $(R_{b1,1}, R_{b2,2}, \dots)$ for b in $h(M)$</p>
Crypto.	<p>Unconditional: $p_P(P C) = p_P(P)$</p> <p>Fixed/variable length input</p> <p>random functions</p> <p>Pseudo-random function: deterministic, efficiently computable, cannot be distinguished by practical statistical/cryptanalytical test from a random function</p> <p>Random sources: hardware, user behaviour, timing of peripheral, A/D noise, network timing, high-resolution time</p>	Stream Auth.	<p>Verify each packet immediately, but don't sign each message: have $C_i = h(C_{i+1}, M_i)$ then send $C_1, \text{Sig}(C_1), (C_2, M_1), \dots, (0, M_n)$</p>
Secure Hashes	<p>Preimage resistance: for given y, cannot find x st. $h(x) = y$</p> <p>Second preimage res.: for given x, cannot find x' st. $h(x') = h(x)$</p> <p>Collision resistance: cannot find $x \neq y$ st. $h(x) = h(y)$</p> <p>Based on fixed input length PRF called a "compression function"</p> <p>Input bitstring X padded by 1, then filled to block width by 0</p> $H_i = C(H_{i-1} X_i), \text{ fixed } H_0$ <p>Birthday: k balls, n bins, prob. bin have 1 ball: $\frac{n!}{k! n^k}, k = \sqrt{n}$</p>	Blockcipher	<p>Key dependent permutation</p> <p>Confusion, diffusion</p> $P = L_0 R_0, R_i = R_{i-1} \oplus f(L_{i-1})$ <p>(odd) $L_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1})$ (even)</p> <p>Need at least 3 rounds for rnd.</p> <p>DES: 16 rounds, 56 bit key, 64 bit block, f uses XOR of scheduled key with block through S-boxes</p> <p>Triple DES:</p> $E(X) = DES_{K_3}(DES_{K_2}^{-1}(DES_{K_1}(X)))$
MAC	<p>$MAC_K(M) = h(K M)$, but vulnerable to message extension attack with compression-h</p>	ECB	<p>Cut message into n-bit blocks and encrypt separately: bad since patterns + input alphabet is limited (plaintext ASCII only)</p>
Hash Chain	<p>$R_i = h(R_{i-1})$, random R_0, then store R_n in server, R_s to clients. Client sends R_{i-1} and server compares hash of to its R_i</p>	CBC	<p>$C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$, random C_0</p>
		MAC	<p>As CBC, but no C_0 and transmit only last C: can verify message if you know the secret key</p>
		Hash From Blockcipher	<p>$H = X \oplus E_K(X)$</p> $H_i = H_{i-1} \oplus E_{X_i}(H_{i-1})$
		Random Bit Stream	<p>$R_i = E_K(R_{i-1})$, replace K before</p> <p>$2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ numbers have been made</p>
		OFM	<p>As above, $R_0 = 0, C_i = P_i \oplus R_i$</p>
		CTR	<p>$R_i = E_K(i + O), C_i = P_i \oplus R_i$, could transmit O with message</p>
		CFB	<p>$C_i = P_i \oplus E_K(C_{i-1})$, random C_0</p>
		Diffie-Hellman	<p>Large prime $p, g \in Z_p^*, A, B$</p> <p>generate $x, y < p - 1$. Now: $A \Rightarrow B: g^x \text{ mod } p, B \Rightarrow A: g^y \text{ mod } p$, each uses $h(g^{xy})$ as shared key</p>
		EIGamal	<p>A publishes (p, g, g^x) and keeps x. Now: $B \Rightarrow A: (g^y \text{ mod } p, (g^{xy} M) \text{ mod } p)$ and A calculates $[g^{xy} M][g^{y(p-1-x)}] \text{ mod } p = M$</p>
		EIGamal Signature	<p>A generates y and solves $xg^y + ys = M \text{ (mod } p)$ for s, then certificate is $(M, g^y \text{ mod } p, s)$. B</p>

PKI	can then test equation raised to the power of g on both sides Certificate authority issues $Cert_C(A) = \{A, K_A, T, L\} K_C^{-1}$, where C confirms K_A belongs to A for T to $T + L$: anyone who knows K_C can verify this. Now can establish chain of trusted certificates
Passwords	Reject delay, monitor failure, password strength, randomness
Challenge Response Mutual Challenge Response	$A \Rightarrow B: N$ $B \Rightarrow A: h(K_{ab} N)$ or $\{N\}_{K_{ab}}$ $A \Rightarrow B: N_a$ $B \Rightarrow A: \{N_a, N_b\}_{K_{ab}}$ $A \Rightarrow B: N_b$ Has attack where new session to A can be used to authenticate a B who does not know K : make K_{ab} different from K_{ba}
One Time Key Generating Key Kerberos	$B \Rightarrow A: C, \{C\}_{K_{ab}}$, C increases Card A_i has I , $K_i = \{i\}_K$. Now: $A_i \Rightarrow B: i$, $B \Rightarrow A_i: N$, $A_i \Rightarrow B: h(K_i N)$ Only one K , store in every device $A \Rightarrow S: A, B$ $S \Rightarrow A: \{T_s, L, K_{ab}, B, \{T_s, L, K_{ab}, A\}_{K_{bs}}\}_{K_{as}}$ $A \Rightarrow B: \{T_s, L, K_{ab}, A\}_{K_{bs}}, \{A, T_a\}_{K_{ab}}$ $B \Rightarrow A: \{T_a + 1\}_{K_{ab}}$ Trusted third party, tickets have lifetime and timestamp, limit use
Discretionary Access Control Mandatory Access Control	Owners have discretion how they want to share their objects: identity based access System wide policy based access, e.g. prevents certain information flows. Enforced without owner consent
UNIX	User, group, other bits SUID: effective, real and saved (initial effective) UIDs/GIDs Directories: read = list, write = remove files/empty dirs, execute = traverse, sticky = whether write is sufficient to delete files in the directory
Windows	Access control lists stored with owner with object, object types have their own permission lists
Principle Of Least Priv.	Implemented as transferable capabilities: combine the notion of a reference and rights
MAC Policy	Air gap security

Commercial Integrity	Data pump/diode Bell/LaPadula: subjects and objects have confidentiality labels, system prevents flow from high to low level objects, trusted subjects can override Covert channels: resource conflicts, timing, resource state Internal consistency (checked automatically), external consistency (describes the real world) Constrained Data Items only accessed via Transformation Procedures: certify TPs, some TPs can convert UDIs, all must log sufficient audit information Integrity Verification Procedures for every CDI Require authentication for subjects and checks on (subject, TP, CDI) triplets before allowing execution
TCB	The parts of a system that enforce a security policy and whose correct operation is sufficient to ensure enforced
OS Security	Domain separation: protect TCB from external interference Reference mediation: accesses by untrusted subjects must be validated by the TCB Residual information protection: when allocated or deallocated
Security Classification	DoD Orange Book. D: no auth, C1: discretionary, C2: auditing, ACLs, B1: labels, tests, B2: formal security policy, identify covert channels, B3: security alarms, minimal TCB, A1: formally verified design
Vulnerability	Viruses spread where binary programs are exchanged and writable by other programs Checks for data size, data content, boundary conditions, missing locks, race conditions, environment checks, auth.
Networks	Protocols not designed for hostile environments, bus and broadcast technologies, DDOS TCP: start sequence number acts as authentication nonce

SYN flood: local buffer allocated for every SYN packet

DNS: cache unsolicited query

Firewall: matches sets of IPs / port numbers, plausibility check on source IPs, logs + audits, but no protection against insiders or tunnels, disrupts deployment of new protocols

Security Policy Construction

1. Identify assets + value, vulnerabilities, threats, legal requirements, priorities
2. Work out suitable policy: first high level security policy that clarifies what are authorised, required and prohibited activities, states and information flows
3. Document high level policy in security policy document: reference for implement.
4. Select and implement controls: general responsibilities, overall responsibility for maintenance, enforcement, review, owners for individual information assets, reporting responsibilities, process review, disciplinary action, incentives, user training, personnel security, physical security, segregation of duties, auditing, backup, media disposal, encryption etc....

Computer Misuse

Causing a computer to perform a function with the intent to access without authorization
Unauthorised modification to impair operation / hinder access

DPA

- Fairly + lawfully proc.
- Proc. for limited purps.
- Adequate, relevant
- Accurate
- Not kept for longer than necessary
- Processed in accordance with subject rights
- Secure
- Not transferred to countries without prot.